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REMEDYING THE LOSE-LOSE GAME OF
COMPULSIVE GAMBLING: VOLUNTARY
EXCLUSIONS, MANDATORY EXCLUSIONS,
OR AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD?
WILLIAM

N.

THOMPSON,* ROBERT W. STOCKER, II**

& PETER J. KULICK"*

INTRODUCTION

Compulsive gamblers present a serious problem to the casino
industry. They represent threats to industry integrity, political
viability, legal standing and commercial success. This Article
reviews some of these threats as well as suggested remedies that
might mitigate the dangers pathological gambling poses to casinos
and society as a whole.
This Article first looks at the expansion of casino gaming over
the past two decades.
Then it reviews assessments of the
prevalence of troubled (pathological and problem) gaming, along
with costs associated with troubled gaming. Next, it looks at a
range of "solutions," including prohibition of casino gaming and
major law suits against gambling operators, and major changes in
casino operations, including the games offered to players. The
major portion of the Article examines solutions focused upon
troubled players: voluntary banning, mandatory banning, and
creation of a list of "un-welcomed" players.
I.

THE CASINO-IZATION OF AMERICA

At some moment during the late 1980s or the early 1990s, a
corner was turned. Casino gaming quite suddenly became an
acceptable leisure time industry in North America (the United
States and Canada).
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Perhaps it was the moment on October 17, 1988, when
President Ronald Reagan took a pen into his hands and signed the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.' The Act declared in effect that
casino gaming could be a tool for Indian tribes to promote "tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments." Never before had the heretofore scornful federal
government given its official praise to gaming activities anywhere
by anyone.
Maybe it was a month later when the voters of South Dakota
embraced a "limited" form of casino gaming for the revival of
tourism in the town of Deadwood. 3 Or, perhaps it was in 1989
when the Iowa legislature gave authorization for casino gaming
operations on riverboats as a means to promote good family fun on
quests to feel the excitement Mark Twain had experienced over
one hundred years before. 4 Maybe it was when the first Iowa
casino boats began their excursions in 1991, or when the Governor
of Louisiana, Edwin Edwards, signed the law permitting licensing
of a large land-based casino in New Orleans.5
A case could also be made that the moment came in Canada
in December 1989 when the country's first permanent (everyday
and year-around) casino was opened by the Manitoba Lottery
Foundation at the Fort Garry Hotel in Winnipeg.6 Then again, the
moment might have occurred in Nevada in 1993 as the legislature
then gave approval to all the state's casino license holders to
pursue casino licenses elsewhere without first having to get
approval from the Nevada Gaming Commission.7
1. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497 (1998).
2. Id. § 2702(1). Prior federal acts pertaining to gambling had carried a
very negative and punative tone. See WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 120, 120-22

(2001). A series of lottery acts were designed to impede operations of lotteries
by forbidding using mail for advertising or selling tickets or using broadcast
media to promote lotteries. Id. In 1876, President Grant signed into law an
act imposing penalties on persons using the mail to advertise lotteries. Id. In
1894, legislation was passed prohibiting importation of lottery tickets from
other countries, while in 1895, Congress passed an act suppressing lottery
traffic in national or interstate commerce. Id. The laws were used in
attempts to end sales of Irish Sweepstakes tickets in the mid 20th century. Id.
In 1934, the new Federal Communications Act banned advertisements of
lotteries on radio stations. Id. Later, the law applied to television stations.
Id. State government run lotteries did win an exemption to the 1934 act in
1975. Id. The Federal Wire Act of 1961 imposed prison sentences as well as
fines on individuals using any wire communication for transmitting bets on
sports events across state lines. Id.
3. ANTHONY CABOT, South Dakota, INT'L CASINO LAW, 138 (3d ed. 1999).
4. LORENZO D. CREIGHTON, Iowa, INT L CASINO LAw, 39 (3d ed. 1999).
5. HAROLD A. BUCHLER, CONRAD BUCHLER, WILLIAM CREDO, & ROBERT

RAYMOND, Louisiana, INT'L CASINO LAw, 42-63 (3d ed. 1999).
6. BILL FUNK, Manitoba, INTL CASINO LAw, 180-185 (3d ed. 1999).
7. WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, Nevada Goes Global: The Foreign Gaming Rule
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While one or more of these events might have been the
"spark" or the "catalyst" for an unparalleled expansion of
commercial, tribal and government casinos in America (which
before 1988 were confined to the state of Nevada and Atlantic
City, New Jersey), casinos were soon the "rage." Within fifteen
years (that is, up to the present point in time), commercial casino
gaming was present in twelve states, Native American (U.S.A.)
casinos in at least thirty states, First Nations (Canadian) casinos
in five provinces, and government casinos (some with private
operators) in seven Canadian provinces."
The growth of commercial casino gaming in eleven American
states is illustrated on Table 1. In 1990, revenues for these
casinos amounted to $8.3 billion.9 This represented less than onethird of all gaming revenues (32% of $26.6 billion). ° The few
Native American casinos then operating did not alter the basic
statistics much.
By contrast, in 2005, commercial casinos
produced $30.3 billion in gaming revenues, while Native American
casinos added another $22.6 billion. All casinos together took in
63% of the $83.7 billion wagered and held by gaming operators."

and the Spread of Casinos, THE GRIT BENEATH THE GLITTER, 347-62 (H.
Rothman & Mike Davis eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2002). In 1959, the Nevada
Gaming Commission adopted Rule 3.060, which prohibited Nevada casino
license holders from being involved in any gaming activities outside the state
even if the outside activities were otherwise legal.
In 1977, the state
legislature repealed the rule, and in its place imposed a provision requiring
that the Nevada Gaming Commission give prior approval before a Nevada
operator could seek an outside license. If all permissions were granted, that
Nevada Commission retained a right to oversee all aspects of the outside
gaming. The change was prompted by the approval of casino gaming for
Atlantic City in New Jersey. Several Nevada casino licensees expressed
interest in having casinos on the East Coast. The rule still inhibited Nevada
casinos from becoming involved in campaigns to legalize casinos elsewhere,
and it also imposed delays and barriers to entry for gaming elsewhere. With
several states legalizing casinos in the early 1990s, Nevada had a change of
heart and the restrictions were totally removed in 1993 and all at once Nevada
interests became movers and shakers in efforts to legalize and establish
casinos throughout the United States.
8. Patricia McQueen, North America Gaming at a Glance, INT'L GAMING
WAGERING BUSINESS, Nov. 2005, at 17, 20, 22; CASINO CiTy's GLOBAL GAMING
ALMANAC, 245-46, 271-77 (Casino City Press 2006).
9. See INTERNATIONAL GAMING AND WAGERING BUSINESS MAGAZINE,
http://www.americangaming.org/industry/factsheets/statistics.cfm,
(providing
revenues drawn from statistics in annual reports) (last visited August 15,
2007).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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1994
1995
1996
1997
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1999
2000
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2003
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112

Commercial

Total

Casino
Revenue
(Billions)

Gaming
Revenue
(Billions)

$8.3
$8.6
$9.6
$11.2
$13.8
$16.0
$17.1
$18.2
$19.7
$22.2
$24.3
$25.7
$26.5
$27.0
$28.9
$30.3

$26.6
$27.1
$30.4
$34.7
$39.8
$45.1
$47.9
$50.9
$54.9
$58.2
$61.4
$63.3
$68.6
$72.9
$78.8
$83.7

While we can debate exactly what the "spark" was behind this
growth, there were political, social, and economic forces at work as
well. Casinos make a lot of money from their games, albeit
individual casinos do not always reap wonderful net profits. The
new
hard-to-win
pushes
and
lobbies
industry
casino
authorizations for more casinos.
After one co-author testified to Pennsylvania legislative
committees regarding a law to permit casinos at racetracks, Frank
Farenkopf was called to testify.1 3 He is the President of the
American Gaming Association. The AGA represents the large
casinos of America, and it has a budget of $25 million per year to
promote the interests of casinos. 4 One of its interests is to gain

12. Id.
13. Frank Farenkopf, Address at the Pennsylvania General Assembly (Apr.
30, 2003).
14. Diana Marrero, Influence Comes at a Price, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 3,
2007, at 3. The creation of the American Gaming Association came in direct
response to President Clinton's initiative to impose a national 4% tax on all

gambling winnings. Heretofore critical gaming issues such as taxation issues
were fought out at the state and local government level. Now the arena for
battle was Congress and the Office of the President. Casinos could not accept
this new tax without a fight. They organized, they mobilized, and they fought.
The tax was defeated. While that was the outcome, a battle lost in 1994,

President Clinton won a major war in the process. The move to institute a
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legal status for commercial casinos in as many venues as possible.
A pull factor bringing about the expansion of all gaming,
including casino gaming, is the federal budgetary system and the
general economy. In the early 1980s a recession caused state
Many
governments to encounter major budgeting shortfalls.
states responded by adopting state-operated lotteries." The 1980s
also witnessed a turnabout in federal spending policies. The
sharing
revenue
introduced
had
Nixon Administration
mechanisms at the beginning of the 1970s. 1' The federal
government of the United States passed large sums of money to
state and local governments using a formula based upon
population, poverty and tax efforts of the states. The revenue
sharing policies were initiated at a time when the federal
government had a very small operating deficit. (In 1968 the
federal government had a balanced budget)."
By the Reagan years, the federal deficit was growing rapidly.
Reagan cut taxes. He also made bold moves to cut all non-defense
spending. He eliminated the revenue sharing program entirely in
1986; it had been declining sharply up until that time. 8 But he
did more that devastated state budgets. He (via congressional
action) eliminated several federal social service programs, and he
mandated that the states deliver the services from their own
national gaming tax was one of the most brilliant political moves ever
launched by a president. Casinos were now organized, and they were now
engaged in the national political process. Gaming interests led by the A.G.A.
became a major player in the 1996 reelection campaign of President Clinton.
He reaped large contributions from commercial casinos and Native American
casinos. Casinos stayed around to make large contributions to all subsequent
national election campaigns as well.
15. See JOHN DOMBRINK & WILLIAM THOMPSON, THE LAST RESORT:
SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN CAMPAIGNS FOR CASINOS, 126 (Univ. of Nev. Press

1990) (discussing state operated lotteries). Dates of adoption of lotteries by
popular vote (with %age number of voters in favor - if by election) or
legislative action (1970 to 1990): Virginia 1970, 63% (not implemented); New
Jersey 1976, 81%; Connecticut 1972; Pennsylvania 1972; Washington 1972,
62% (Implimented in 1982); Iowa 1972, 67% (not implemented); Michigan
1972, 73%; Maryland 1972, 77%; North Dakota 1972, 58% (not implemented);
Maine 1973, 72%; Ohio 1973, 64%; Rhode Island 1973, 76%; Illinois 1974;
Vermont 1976; Colorado 1976; Arizona 1981; West Virginia 1984, 66%; Oregon
1984, 66%; California 1984, 58%; Missouri 1984, 68%; South Dakota 1986,
60%; Montana 1986, 69%; Idaho 1986, 60% (not implemented); Kansas 1986,
64%; Florida 1986, 64%; Virginia 1987, 57%; Wisconsin 1987; Idaho 1988,
52%; Idaho 1988, 52%; Minnesota 1988, 59%; Kentucky 1988, 61%; Indiana
1988, 62%. Id. at 189.
16. Robert Kuttner, Revenue Sharing, Anyone, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19,
2001.
17. See, e.g., Lyndon Johnson, Annual Budget Message to Congress (Jan.
24, 1967); Clay Chandler, After Decades of Deficits, Expectations of Surplus,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1998, at A-01.
18. John Kincaid, The State of American Federalism 1986, 17 THE JOURNAL
OF FEDERALISM 1, 1-33 (1987).
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funding sources." This budget double-whammy soon met up with
another recession in the early 1990s producing a "perfect storm"
pulling at state policy makers. The storm pulled them toward
endorsements of more casino gaming as a means for gaining
needed government revenues.
The public had been quite skeptical about embracing casinos
before the late 1980s.2 0 However, the same public was adamant in
its opposition to new taxes. A major issue leading to the reelection defeat of President George H. W. Bush in 1992 was his
breaking of a pledge to have "no new taxes."' The public also
began to see casinos near their communities. While opponents
continued to make noise about their negative qualities, the public
heard good stories too. They experienced the effects of the win-win
game.
The casino industry has a great advantage over every other
industry. Casinos offer the win-win game to customers, and this
allows them to realize the best word-of-mouth advertising
anywhere. Quite simply, "winners talk, and losers walk." Tales of
wins spread like wildfire and spread loudly as they leave the lips
of lucky (or even occasionally lucky) players, while stories of losses
are muted and hidden among more vocal expressions of
satisfactions with great buffets, shows, room bargains, near
misses, and for Las Vegas casinos, great weather. 3
Other industries suffer with a fact of life that complainers
become more noticeable. For every bad customer story coming out
of a department store, or auto dealership, etc., the entrepreneur
needs twelve good stories to make up for the damage. 4 Many

19. Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., Fiscal Federalism in 1986: The Spotlight
Continues to Swing Toward the States and Local Governments, 17 THE
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 35 (1987).

20. DOMBRINK, supra note 15 (documenting the public rejection of casinos
from 1964 through 1988). Voters did approve of casinos for Atlantic City by

56% in 1976, although two years earlier casinos were defeated in New Jersey
with a positive vote of only 40%. Id. Casinos received positive votes of only
27% in Florida in 1978; 32% in Florida in 1986; several advisory votes in
Pennsylvania and Michigan with the support levels being between 20% and
41%; only 39% in Arkansas in 1964 and 29.5% in 1984; and 33% in Colorado in
1984. Id. In the 1980's, legislative defeats of casinos were experienced several
times in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Louisiana, and Ohio. Id.
21. Read My Lips: No New Taxes, Wikipedia Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonew-taxes (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
22. See WILLIAM THOMPSON

& MICHELE COMEAU,

CASINO CUSTOMER

SERVICE: THE WIN WIN GAME (1993).

23. William Thompson, To Keep the Winning Formula, 1 CASINO
EXECUTIVE 57, 57-58 (1995); W. Dorn, Blue Chip Specials: Insights Shared
over Many a Club Sandwich, 1 CASINO EXECUTIVE 11, 11-12 (1995).
24. THOMPSON, supra note 22, at 26.

2007]

Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling

1227

advantages and many factors account for the dramatic rise of the
amount of casino gaming in our society.
II. A

SNAG TO THE SUCCESSFUL GAME:
IT'S NOT ALWAYS A WINNING ONE

Casinos have a win-win game, but they can lose the game.
The game is lost if players ever feel that they were cheated, or if
the games were dishonest.
A. Bad Service Is a Game Killer
The game is lost if the "losers" encounter bad service delivery.
The game is lost when people believe that the casinos have
exploited the players. Everywhere, government regulators and
internal security personnel work very hard to keep all the games
honest. Casino managers who have any good sense at all work
overtime to maintain top levels of customer service in the casinos.
B. Exploitation Makes Casinos Losers: Compulsive
Gaming Is a Lose-Lose Game
The one remaining area that can destroy the Win-Win game
is exploitation, and here our casinos and our gaming venues need
to step-up and do a better job. Exploitation may be tied to
Stories about troubled
pathological and problem gambling.
gamblers losing all their wealth spread by word-of-mouth, and
they are also spread in sensationalized media accounts. As these
stories of losses grow, they are embellished with images of
embezzlements at work places or offices of charities, or families
broken apart and put in distress, and, of course, of suicides. It is
in the vital interest of casinos that these stories not spread, that
these stories not exist, and that the cases of problem gaming and
the effects of problem gaming be mitigated and reduced as much
as possible.

III. How MANY COMPULSIVE GAMERS ARE THERE?
There have been well over one hundred studies seeking to
determine the prevalence of troubled pathological and problem gaming in society. 21 Most find that about one percent of the adult
population consists of pathological gamers, while twice that many
adults are deemed to be problem gamers. The first study was
completed by a University of Michigan Research team in the mid1970s.2 6 The study concluded that 0.77% of the population could
25. Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall & Joni Vander Bilt, Estimating the
Prevalence of DisorderedGamblingBehavior in the United States and Canada:
A Research Synthesis, Harvard Medical School (1999).

26. Maureen Kallick-Kaufman, The Micro and Macro Dimensions of
Gambling in the United States, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, 7-26 (1979). The
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be designated as pathological. Problem gamers were 2.33 & of the
population.
In 1997 Harvard Medical School researchers
constructed a "meta-study" of 120 existing studies. Their study
was funded by the casino industry's National Center for
Responsible Gaming. Combining the 120 studies, they concluded
that 1.14% of adults were in a category comparable to
"pathological" garners, while 2.80% were in the "problem" category.
The pathological prevalence rate had27increased from 0.84% (1977
to 1993) to 1.29% (from 1994 to 1997).
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission asked the
National Opinion Research Center to conduct its prevalence study
in 1999. The NORC found 0.6% met the criteria of current-year
pathological, while 0.7% were deemed to be current-year problem
garners. 21
One of the congressionally authorized Commission studies
also concluded that the prevalence rates doubled where casinos
were found to be within fifty miles of a community. 29 Hence it was
not unexpected that Rachel Volberg's 2002 study of Nevada
residents found that 3.5% were pathological and 2.9% were
problem gamers.3 0

studies used in this study were typically based upon general population
surveys which asked respondents if they exhibited certain gaming behaviors.
If they said "Yes" to a number of the questions, they were labeled as being a
"problem," or a "pathological" gambler. Often, the studies asked if a person
displayed a number of symptoms from a list provided in an edition of the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).
More typically, they would use questions from the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (SOGS), a survey used by treatment professionals to determine the
severity of one's gambling affliction. The SOGS questionnaire included the
following items: (1) a list of gambling activities and how often a person
participated in them, (2) how large one's bets had been, (3) other persons in
family who had gambling problems, (4) if a person returned to gamble after
having a losing session, and how soon they returned, (5) lying about gambling
wins, (6) if the person felt they had a gambling problem, (7) if one gambled
more than they intended to gamble, (8) if others had criticized the person for
gambling, (9) if the person felt guilty about the way he or she gambled, (10) if
the person wanted to stop gambling but could not do so, (11) if the person had
hidden gambling tickets or other information about their gambling, (12) if they
argued with others about money (13) if they argued with others about
gambling, (14) if they had borrowed money in order to gamble, (15) if they had
ever lost time from work, school, or family events because of gambling, and
(16) if they borrowed money to pay back gambling debts and the sources of
money borrowed.

See RONALD M. PAVALKO, PROBLEM GAMBLING AND ITS

TREATMENT, 47, 47-50 (2001).
27. Shaffer, supra note 25.
28. National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, 4-5 to 4-6
(June, 1999) [hereinafter NGISC].
29. Id. at 4-4.
30. Rachael A. Volberg, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN NEVADA:
REPORT TO THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, NV Dept.

Human Resources (March 22, 2002).
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THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF TROUBLED GAMING

Several studies have assessed the costs of troubled gambling
for society.31 The studies have interviewed self-defined compulsive
gamblers, most often members of Gamblers Anonymous ("G.A.")
groups. To be sure, these problem gamblers were likely to have
encountered (or caused) more severe consequences than the
problem gambler on the street. Actually other researchers found
that the "on-the-street" compulsive gambler (measured by the
South Oaks Gambling Screen, a tool widely accepted in the
research community) exhibited costs which were 51% of those
exhibited by typical G.A. members. Hence, one seeking to project
costs to a full population in an area could discount the numbers
appropriately.
One study of southern Nevada compulsive gamblers found
that they had lost work-time amounting to 8.69 hours per month,
while 22.9% quit work, losing 4.2 months of employment due to
gambling, and 24.2% were fired, losing 2.4 months of employment.
Only 3.4% accepted welfare because of gambling, whereas 5.8%
accepted food stamps. Nearly 15% of compulsive gamblers were
hospitalized because of health problems related to gambling, while
23.0% had outpatient treatments.
Nearly two-thirds (65.9%)
planned suicides, while 27.7% attempted suicide.32
Before joining G.A., they had average debts (because of
gambling) of $60,714., with 45.4% having incurred personal
bankruptcies, and 15.1% had been sued in court over debts. A
majority (63.3%) had stolen property because of gambling, with
the average thefts (spread over all the respondents) amounting to
$13,517. Nine had been arrested, with the average respondent
serving 0.16 months in jail or prison, and 0.10 months on
probation.33
This self-reported information helped in formulating a cost
profile. The collective costs were annualized with an assumption
that they had occurred over a four-year period of gambling. As

31. William N. Thompson, Ricardo Gazel, & Dan Rickman, The Social Costs
of Gambling in Wisconsin, WIS. POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1996); WEFA
Group, A Study Concerning the Effects of Legalized Gambling on the Citizens
of the State of Connecticut (June 1997); James Westphal, Estimating the Social
Cost of Gambling for Louisiana, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
CENTER (1999); William N. Thompson & F. Quinn, An Economic Analysis of
Machine Gambling in South Carolina, EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE
SOUTH CAROLINA POLICY COUNCIL (1999); William N. Thompson & Keith R.

Schwer, Beyond the Limits of Recreation: Social Costs of Gambling in
Southern Nevada, 17 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING AND
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 62 (2005); EARL L. GRINOLS, GAMBLING IN AMERICA:
COSTS AND BENEFITS, 131-74 (Cambridge Univ. Press).

32. Thompson, supra note 31, at 77-79.
33. Id. at 75-77.
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shown in Table 2, the study found an annual cost figure for one
pathological gambler to be $19,711 per year.'
Table 2
Impact Profile of the Average GA. Gambler Annualized
Cost of Missed Work
Cost of Quitting Jobs
Cost of FiredJobs
Cost Unemployment Comp
Debt/Bankruptcy
Costs of Thefts
Cost Civil Suits
Costs of Arrests
Costs of Trials
Costs of Jail Time
Costs of Probation
Costs of Food Stamps
Costs of Welfare
Costs of Treatment
TOTAL

$2,364*
$1,092*
$1,581*
$87 G
$9,493
$3,379
$777 G*
$95 G*
$85 G*
$80 G*
$170 G*
$50 G
$84 G
$372*
$19,711

The costs are defined as the disamenities borne by persons
other than the gambler. However, we acquiesce with critics who
indicate that these are not all "deadweight" costs that subtract
wealth for the entire economy, but instead many are costs that are
merely transferred from one person to another. Therefore, those
costs are marked with an asterisk (*). They total $6616, or 33.6%
of the total. Costs to government (whether transfer costs or
deadweight economic costs) are marked as "G" and total $1428, or
7.2% of the total.35
The cost profile did not factor in several costs that are quite
real, yet very illusive, when it comes to placing a real dollar figure
on them.
These include stresses that reduce on the job
productivity, as well as social costs of disruption to normal family
activities (e.g., long term costs of child neglect and lost college
funds for future education, lost resources resulting from divorce or
separation of spouses). Also, the profile does not put a cost on
suicide. Of course, the researchers cannot interview troubled
gamers who have committed suicide. However, the survey of G.A.
members found twenty-five of ninety (37%) say they actually
attempted to commit suicide. Research suggests that disturbed

34. Id. at 83.
35. Id. at 89-90.
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gamers are more likely to commit suicide than any other category
of addicted persons."
If only 4% of the suicide attempts were "successful," we could
expect that there would be at least one suicide for each one
hundred pathological gamers. That would be costly to society, in a
deadweight economic manner, because that person's productivity
would be lost forever. The average G.A. member in the survey was
forty-seven years old and hence had a remaining work-life of
eighteen years. Their average income was $52,000. One suicide
would result in an economic loss of $930,000 over eighteen years.
If the cost were assigned to the profile, it might represent an
additional $520 to that amount.3 '
Mitigations of the severity of troubled gaming and solutions
reducing the numbers of troubled garners in society will help
eliminate very large economic losses felt by society.
V. MITIGATION OF TROUBLED GAMING

A. ProhibitGambling
While it is almost axiomatic to say that "prohibition failed,"
the statement is used in reference to the prohibition of drinking
alcoholic beverages between 1919 and 1933 in the United States. 8
There is no need to argue that point either way; the statement is
simply accepted whether or not it is true. However, to make a
similar analogy with prohibition of casino gambling activities is
another matter. During the first three decades of the Twentieth
Century, there was a virtual prohibition on casino gambling in the
United States. To be sure, there were many illegal gambling
outlets, however, they were not nearly as plentiful as drinking
outlets during the Prohibition (of alcohol) Era.
Moreover
developments of machine gambling were in their infant stages,
hence, machines whether legal or not, did not permeate all
communities. They were not ubiquitous.
The Prohibition Era of casinos did witness the development of
certain "sin" cities where gambling was tolerated in an atmosphere
of corrupt relationships between operators and law enforcement
authorities. In communities such as Newport, Kentucky, Hot
Springs, Arkansas, Galveston, Texas, and Phenix City, Alabama,

36. Id. at 88-89; see, e.g., GRINOLS, supra note 31, at 141-42; PAVALKO,
supra note 26; Charles C. Thomas, Problem Gambling and Its Treatment, 2425 (2001).
37. Thompson, supra note 31, at 88-89.

38. See U. S. CONST. amend. XVIII (instituting prohibition in 1919); see also
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XXI (repealing prohibition in 1933).
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illegal casinos flourished in the open. 39 But casino gaming did not
flourish throughout the country as did drinking activity.
Moreover, the years after Nevada broke the national
prohibition on casinos with the 1931 legalization of "wide-open"
casinos, found a distinct heightening of enforcement against
casinos in other jurisdictions. National anti-crime campaigns
focused upon casinos operated by organized crime "mob" elements.
The Mobsters took notice and actively sought to remove
themselves from the new scrutiny of the law. The solution to their
problems was easy: Move to Las Vegas. 40 The leaders of organized
crime (names such as Meyer Lansky may be used here) aided the
cause of all illegal operators and also the commercial interests of
Las Vegas as they declared the City to be an "open city," that is, a
city that welcomed establishment of new casinos by anyone. 41
Gangsters associated with the "New York" mob families could
come to Las Vegas, so too could operatives from the "Philadelphia
family," the "Chicago and Los Angeles family," the "Kansas City
and Detroit family," or even those who were not "mobsters," people
with no organized crime connections at all.
As the illegal
operators from elsewhere abandoned Hot Springs, Newport and
Galveston for the legal security of Las Vegas, casino prohibition
became much more effective nationwide; that is, nationwide,
minus Nevada. And so it remained effective in forty-nine states
until Atlantic City's legal casinos emerged in 1978, and in fortyeight states prior to the events of 1988.
But could a casino prohibition work today? Probably not.
First, the condition of prohibition could not be achieved in the
current political atmosphere. In 1919, liquor was legal in half the
states, as now casinos are operating in about two-thirds of the
states (states with 90% or more of the national population).
Moreover, now gambling is a product that reaches into every state.
Legal casinos, lotteries and charity games and race betting
operations are in forty-eight states (all except Utah and Hawaii).
39. DOMBRINK, supra note 15, at 139; MARGARET A. BARNES, THE TRAGEDY
AND TRIUMPH OF PHENIX CITY, ALABAMA (1998).
40. WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 83, 209 (2001).
41. Interview with Jack Binion in Las Vegas, Nev. (Sept. 20, 2003). The
policy adopted by "the Mob" has had tremendous positive economic impacts for
Las Vegas. The "Mob" endorsed wide-open capitalism. Everyone was welcome
to come to town, make their investment in casinos, and compete for customers.
In so competing they embraced Say's Law, which was simply stated: "Demand
will rise to meet supply." Say's Law was more simply put forth by actor Kevin

Costner in the film "Field of Dreams": "Build it, and they will come." More
and more casinos in Las Vegas resulted in more and more customers, and in
turn more and more casinos. And so the game of open entry and free
competition has continued down to the present day which finds 40,000,000
visitors coming to Las Vegas each year spending nearly $9 billion on gambling
activities and more than that on hotel rooms, meals, shows, and shopping.

20071

Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling

1233

In all fifty states, players can be connected to casino-type games
through their personal computers, albeit such play is illegal (but
tolerated as the "laws" are not enforceable against players, or, to
put it another way, nobody seeks to enforce the laws against the
players).
A large majority of the members of Congress represent
populations that gain substantial revues from taxation of casinos
or from lottery operations. The will to impose a prohibition on
casino activity and hence see states they represent lose public
revenues is quite lacking whatever their moral position on the
subject may be.
Moreover, gambling is quite advanced. PCs and machines are
ubiquitous even where they are illegal. The machines are much
more sophisticated and they can be easily disguised as legal video
game machines where they are illegal.42
The difficulty of repealing authorization for casino-style
gaming is illustrated by the fact that only two times in the last
fifty-five years has there been a statewide repeal of a form of such
gaming. In 1953, the Idaho Supreme Court rendered
unconstitutional a 1947 statute that had made slot machines
legal.' In 1999, the highest court of South Carolina interpreted a
statute from the same year to mean that slot machine gaming had
to end in that state."
42. For instance, the video machines may award winners only points and
new games to play rather than money prizes. However, an operator will pay
the player for the points and new games and adjust the machine so that the
points and credits disappear. This is of course done outside the presence of
law enforcement personnel or other "strangers." Machines may also have
mechanisms that call for player interactions, and thereby the operator will
claim that the machines are devices for skill not luck play. Some degree of
luck is usually required in the definition of gambling.
43. State v. Vill. of Garden City, 265 P.2d 328 (1953). In this case, Idaho
Supreme Court Justice Keeton played the role of John Marshall. Id. In 1947,
the state legislature had passed a law authorizing slot machines, as well as
other gaming activities such as punchboards and "chance spindles." Id. A
group of citizens believed that the gaming constituted a public nuisance and
was injurious to the public morals. Id. They sued the Village of Garden City,
as the municipality had licensed the machines and had agreements with the
operators of machines to share in their profits. Id. They claimed that the
machines were in their essential aspects actually lotteries. Id.
Idaho
Constitution article III, § 20, stated that the "legislature shall not authorize
any lottery or gift enterprise under any pretense or for any purpose whatever."
Id. Justice Keeton, writing for the Supreme Court, agreed stating that it is for
the court and not the legislature to determine the meaning of the constitution.
Id. However, the justice did overrule a lower court that had seized possession
of the machines and placed a lien on the business property where they were
located. Id. The Justice instead enjoined further gaming activities in which
the machines were used. Id. The Court held that the businesses had acted in
good faith as they had received licenses to operate the machines and they had
paid fees required by the state. Id.
44. Joytime Distrib. & Amusement Co. v. State, 528 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1999).
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While one who is genuinely concerned about the effects of
expanded gambling upon people drawn into compulsive behaviors
may indeed believe that an effective prohibition will help these
people, that goal is beyond the realm of political feasibility
anytime soon. The two cases mentioned above involved court
action that was unexpected, and in the latter case certainly very
unusual.
Such being the case, those who accept the negative social
costs scenario can still represent a major force opposed to further
expansion of gaming legalizations.
They can make their
opposition felt in local and state political venues, and they can also
urge policy makers to follow the guidelines of the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission as it recommended that
proposed new gaming venues be required to make complete socioeconomic studies of how the new gaming would impact their
citizenry.45 They may also note NGISC recommendations that
urged that gaming not be placed near residential areas of urban
communities, and that machine gaming in neighborhood stores
(convenience stores and bars) not be permitted.46
B. Law Suits to Stop GamingIndustry
The successful prohibition efforts in Idaho and South
Carolina resulted from judicial actions.
While a national
prohibition, or even a new statewide prohibition, is unlikely to
come from the bench or from the political branches of government,
This case teaches a valuable lesson for all attorneys: Think long and hard
before you go to court. You may be seeking a judgment that could destroy your
client. Slot machines proliferated throughout South Carolina during the
1990s. Their authorization was based upon vague legislation that seemed to
impose severe limitations on the way they operated. Operators found
loopholes around the limitations, and in many cases simply ignored the
limitations. Finally, in response to a public outcry the legislature decided that
reforms in the law were necessary. They enacted a bill containing the reforms,
but they went a bit further. They said that before the reforms would be set
into place, the voters would have to approve the machines. If the voters did
not vote in favor of the reforms in a November ballot vote, all machine gaming
would cease in the year 2000. One major operator feared a negative public
vote, so he sued to have the legislation voided. The South Carolina
constitution had no provisions authorizing the legislature to refer their duties
(law-making) to the public for a vote. The Supreme Court carefully reviewed
the constitution and the legislation, and they agreed 100%. Well, maybe 99%.
They ruled that the legislature could not refer any matter of legislation to the
voters. Therefore that provision of the law was unconstitutional. They
cancelled the November ballot vote. But they didn't stop there. They decided
that the remainder of the bill was still intact. Hence, since the people could
not vote in favor of the reforms, they would not vote in favor of the reforms,
and therefore all machine play would cease in the year 2000. The case
effectively shut down 30,000 slot machines.
45. NGISC, supra note 28, at 7-30, 8-5.
46. PAVALKO, supra note 26, at 138.
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court actions could make a severe impact that could restrict
gaming operations.
Law suit judgments against the tobacco industry have soared
into the billions of dollars. Similar results from cases involving
casinos could have a major impact upon industry desires to expand
and enter new venues. Some see it coming. In April 2007,
Windsor, Ontario attorney William Sasso addressed the 11th
Annual Canadian Gaming Summit and offered a very unwelcomed
opinion. He claimed that "if a known gambling addict sued a
casino for not taking steps to control the behavior, the gambler
would likely win. ,,47
Sasso's words were not exactly new ones, but a successful law
suit has yet to be filed. Then again, gaming law authority I.
Nelson Rose (along with co-author Martin D. Owens) wrote:
Gaming is in the same position today that bars were in 40
years ago. The big lawsuits are just waiting to happen. No
bar owner would allow a drunk to be served alcohol, yet
casino owners and other operators allow gamblers who are
obviously out of control to continue to bet.4
Rose and Owens continued, "The growing conflict in the law
over how to deal with compulsive gambling is coming to a head in
cases involving legal gambling. The legal gambling industry
would suffer a terrible blow if it were generally accepted that
compulsive gambling is a true disease." 49 They suggested:
The scenario for a breakthrough case requires the gaming
operator had notice and, ignoring the warning, took action
that proximately caused the injury. Notice can be of the
'should have known' type, or more direct notice in the form of
a phone call or e-mail from a wife, asking the operator not to
give her husband credit because he was compulsive and
suicidal."°
Then they suggested that if a casino gave the credit anyway,
"and the husband killed himself over his gambling problem, a
judge might conclude the operator owed a duty to the wife or
gambler, the operator caused the death, and a jury could return a
verdict of tens of millions of dollars in punitive damages."51
Law professor John Warren Kindt sought a different analogy.
He saw casinos as being a ripe target for state-initiated "mega-law
suits similar to the tobacco cases."52 Kindt offered a scenario of
47. John Stoddard, Odds Are Gamblers Would Win Lawsuit, Experts Say,
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 21, 2007.
48. I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN OWENS, INTERNET GAMING LAW 135 (2005).
49. Id. at 133.
50. Id. at 139.
51. Id. at 139-40.
52. John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States
Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL AND
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state attorneys general coming together to sue casinos for
deception and fraud in their gaming operations. He brushed off a
potential casino defense that state governments encouraged
gambling with awards of licenses in order to gain tax revenues.'
He claimed that the case could be made that states were duped by
an industry (acting like the tobacco industry did) that engaged in
disseminating false information and sponsoring bogus studies
which negated the effects of troubled gambling.54
Rose, Owens and Sasso suggest that several major cases have
been settled out of court, and plaintiff gamblers or victims of their
actions have been granted large payments by casinos. 5 However,
the terms of these agreements have been confidential.'
Three notable cases on tort liability for allowing impaired
patrons to make wagers at casinos were filed in New Jersey. A
1989 case was generated when a gamer named Aboud refused to
pay a gaming loan he had received from the Atlantic City Golden
Nugget casino. 5' When he was sued for recovery of the loan, he
counterclaimed seeking damages covering all of his gaming losses.
He alleged that the Golden Nugget had engaged in negligence,
fraud and malicious conduct for allowing him to make bets while
he was intoxicated. Moreover, the casino continued to serve him
drinks while he was playing and losing.
A federal court interpreting New Jersey law concluded that
the casino owed Aboud a duty to "protect him from foreseeable
risks and refraining from knowingly permitting an invitee to
gamble when that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated." 8
Nevertheless, a jury held that Aboud did not establish a
preponderance of the evidence to prove his contention that he was
sufficiently intoxicated to meet the standards set forth by the
judge. 9
In 1993 the case of Leonard Tose was adjudicated on the same
issue. Tose was a prominent businessman who had been the
owner of the Philadelphia Eagles football team. But he loved to
play his favorite games in Atlantic City casinos. He lost more than
$3 million between 1983 and 1987. Tose sued the Sands casino
with a claim that he had been "given an endless supply of free

DECISION ECONOMICS 17, 17-63 (2001).

53. Id. at 30-31.
54. Id. at 20-21, 30-31.
55. Stoddard, supra note 47; ROSE, supra note 48, at 135.
56. Attorney General Report, Maryland, The House Never Loses and
Maryland Cannot Win: Why Casino Gaming Is a Bad Idea, at n.28 (citing
President Casino Settles Lawsuit, THE SuN HERALD, June 27, 1995, available
at http'J/www.oag.state.md.us/Reports/casinogambling.pdf.
57. GNOC v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989).
58. Id. at 655.
59. Id. at 657.
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drinks and allowed to gamble while drunk.'
The judge allowed
the case to go to a jury, which was instructed to consider Tose's
role in his losses, and if they accepted his contentions, to apportion
the damages accordingly.
The jury could not agree on a
conclusion. He was unable to recover any of his losses.6
In the 1995 case of Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal
Association,62 the federal court did not allow a similar case to go to
the jury. The player, Hakimoglu, sued two Atlantic City casinos
seeking to recover his gaming losses. He claimed that the casinos
"intentionally and maliciously enticed him" to make wagers by
offering him free alcoholic beverages even after he became
intoxicated. The judge examined New Jersey dram-shop laws and
found a clear distinction as to how they would apply to taverns
and bars, on the one hand, and casinos, on the other.'
The judge accepted that players come into casinos with the
intention to gamble. They intend to gamble before the casinos give
them drinks, hence the alcohol cannot be said to remove the
player's inhibitions.' Moreover, a tavern patron does not intend to
cause an accident after drinking, while a player clearly intends to
gamble, even knowing odds and risks. Moreover, the alcohol
cannot clearly be associated with winning or losing, as that is
determined in most games by chance with very sober people losing
as well, and very intoxicated persons on occasion winning. The
judge also found that accidents following tavern drinking happen
very closely in time with the drinking, and that the drinker's
blood-alcohol level is typically checked at the time of the accident.
The player's blood is not checked while he is in the casino playing,
60. ROSE, supra note 48, at 136.
61. Id. at 136; Tose v. Great Bay Hotel, 819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993).
The story of Tose is one of the saddest in sports annuals. He lost ownership of
the team as he was forced to sell the Eagles in order to pay his casino debts.
Have you ever wondered how Detroit could win the right to hold the Super
Bowl in the middle of the winter? They have done so twice. Even though they
have a covered stadium, many feel it is absurd to subject tens of thousands of
fans to the snow and brisk air of Michigan just because Detroit wants a game.
Detroit won the right to have a game because Detroit owner William Clay
Ford was willing to "pay the price." He was befriended by Tose, and he
became "a friend in need," a friend indeed. Ford bailed Tose out of casino debts
with personal loans, which were made in violation of appropriate league rules,
stating that one owner cannot loan or give money to another owner for any
purpose whatsoever. The Ford loans carried a little bit of interest. Tose had
to organize the campaign and gain the votes of other owners in favor of having
the Super Bowl in Detroit (actually Pontiac), Michigan. Tose was very well
liked (most compulsive gamblers have warm and loving personalities), and
besides that the other owners probably appreciated that fact that Ford got
Tose off their backs as compulsive gamblers tend to hit on everyone for money.
62. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 876 F. Supp. 625 (D.N.J. 1995),
affg Hakimoglu v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
63. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 293-94.
64. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 636.
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whether he is winning or losing. Hence, months later it is very
difficult to establish just "how intoxicated" the player was. The
judge ruled in favor of the casino.'
The tort liability arguments as outlined above were not
successful. Therefore, players turned to another line of reasoning,
namely that by giving players drinks, the casinos were removing
the players' rational will to freely enter into contracts for debts to
the casinos.
Here, the argument is that the gamers were
"incompetent to make a contract" at the time the casino gave them
credit.
In Lomonaco v. Sands Hotel Casino & Country Club, the
gamer made such a contract claim.'
He actually informed the
casino that he was a compulsive gambler, and the casino was
aware that his line of credit had been cancelled by another casino.
Nonetheless, the Sands loaned him money to wager. While the
New Jersey court recognized that his will to make a contract may
indeed have been impaired, it still could find nothing in New
Jersey casino legislation indicating that a "disorder of compulsive
gambling" was a legal claim that one's capacity to make a contract
was "void."67
In a more recent case, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.,' a
federal district court in Nevada negated the opportunity for
gamers to file a class action suit against makers and operators of
electronic gaming machines, slot machines and video poker
machines.
The plaintiffs claimed to represent "hundreds of
thousands" of individuals who had played the machines. 9 The
court denied that they could be a class because their play was the
result of individual actions. 0
Some were quite rational
recreational players seeking only fun and entertainment, and
others were quite knowledgeable about how the electronic
machines worked and played anyway. Many won money as a
result of their play, and wins and losses were determined at
random, while indeed others had been fooled into thinking that
their chances were greater than they were by the way the
machines operated in contrast with other mechanical slot
machines.7
Those in the latter category would have to file cases as
individuals, and they would have to demonstrate how they as
individuals had been deceived by the manufacturers and the

65. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294.
66. 614 A.2d 634 (1992).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 639.
379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 662.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 660-61, 664-66.
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casinos operating the machines.72 For instance, they might have to
demonstrate that they knew precisely how mechanical machines
operated, and they had played such machines, and then they were
drawn to the electronic machines deceptively, having been given
the belief that they operated in the same manner." Such a set of
events would not be easy to prove, and because it could not be
proven in a collective manner that could lead to very large
damages (and attorney rewards), the costs of making the case
would not be worth the possible benefits."
C. Changing the Standard OperatingProcedures
While a general or even new local prohibition of gaming is
only a very remote dream of casino critics, as are hopes that a law
suit may accomplish the same ends, there may be hope in
pursuing changes in the way gaming venues and establishments
operate in hopes that troubled gaming can be more limited. There
are suggestions for changes in the atmosphere surrounding casino
gaming, and there are changes that can be recommended
regarding how casinos operate internally.
Environmental changes may focus upon education and
awareness campaigns for schools, as well as for the general
public." Many suggest that schools and government agencies
specifically educate people about the dangers of troubled gaming
and the nature of odds and the games. Notably people should be
informed that the house (casino) has odds advantages in every
72. Id. at 665-66.
73. Id. at 665.
74. Id. at 665-66; Bradley S. Fiorito, Calling a Lemon a Lemon: Regulating
Electronic Gambling Machines to Contain PathologicalGambling, 100 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1325, 1348-50 (citing Gary Rivlin, The Chrome-Shiny, Lights Flashing,
Wheel-Spinning, Touch-Screened, Drew- Carey-Wisecracking, Video Playing,
Sound-Events-Packed, Pulse-Quickening Bandit, NEW YORK TIMES, May 9,
2004, at 42, available at http://facstaff.uww.edu/bertozze/game/readings/band
it.html). Rivlin quoted designers of slot machines expressing disdain for
players. One watched a losing player and said, "Gotcha." A celebrity hired by
the slot machine company to promote play exclaimed, "Step right up .... We
need another sucker." A graphic designer explained: "It's not just push the red
button and watch the reels spin. Make people want to sit there. Use sight
and sound and everything at our disposal to get people's juices going." The
"deeper a player gets into a game, the quicker and louder the music." A
designer added, "I'm not sure players even notice, but the effect is to get them
more excited." Rivlin quoted a professor of psychiatry as saying, "The slot
machine is brilliantly designed from a behavioral psychology perspective ....
No other form of gambling manipulates the human mind as beautifully as
these machines ... I think that's why that's the most popular form of
gambling with which people get into trouble."
75. See, e.g., PAVALKO, supra note 26, at 137-51; Fiorito, supra note 74;
Frank L. Quinn, First Do No Harm: What Could Be Done by Casinos to Limit
Pathological Gambling, 22 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 133;
NGISC, supra note 28, at 4-20.
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game, and therefore it is quite unlikely that a person can
participate in most games with any realistic expectation of
winning. They should look upon the gaming as entertainment.
Also, people should be made aware that in randomized games,
essentially games using randomizing devices (decks of cards, dice,
roulette wheels, and slot machines), the device does not remember
its past activity. Each throw of the dice or spin of a wheel is a new
event totally independent of previous events. 6
There should also be societal education about the signs of
troubled gaming. Many troubled gamers are unaware of their
affliction. Others may be aware, but they deny that their problem
is a serious one. Often people do not know how widespread the
affliction is, and they feel that they are alone and that no other
people would "understand." People should be informed that there
are help sources available. Education campaigns can discuss 800helplines and also that G.A. groups exist in the community. A
first step in treatment of troubled gaming is destroying ignorance
and/or denial."
Within casinos, many things can be done to mitigate the
prevalence and severity of pathological and problem gaming.
Casinos can participate in the activities suggested above. Many
states have requirements such as those mandated by the Nevada
Gaming Commission in 1998.8 All casinos should follow suit and
have brochures and information sheets for ready distribution in
prominent locations of the casino. The brochures should provide
the information suggested and should also inform players about
800 numbers.
A plethora of ideas about games and gaming include some
that are quite feasible and should be considered, as well as others
that would have no reasonable chance for adoption. In the latter
category is Frank Quinn's recommendation that there be minimal
advertising about casinos, and that casinos eliminate or drastically
reduce stimulation effects that lead to more gaming: bright colors,

76. Robert Ladouceur & Michael Walker, Motivation and Cognition in
Gambling 9 J. OF NAT. ASSOC. FOR GAMBLING STUDIES 12 (1997); Robert

Ladoceur, Marie Mayrand & Yves Tourigny, Risk-Taking Behavior in
Gamblers and Non-Gamblers During Prolonged Exposure, 3 J. OF GAMBLING
BEHAVIOR 115 (1985); MICHAEL WALKER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GAMBLING 241

(1992). Michael Walker offers this comment toward the end of his text on
gambling, "the regular and heavy gambler makes greater use of irrational

thinking than the occasional or 'social' gambler."

Id.

His concluding

observation is that "[p]erhaps the most radical approach to therapy is simply
to correct the mistaken beliefs and defective strategies of gamblers by training
the gambler in good money management and optimal gambling strategies."

Id. at 243.
77. PAVALKO, supra note 26, at 104-05.
78. Nevada Gaming Control Board, § 5.170 (1998).
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flashing lights, and exciting noises. 9 Quinn also suggests that slot
machines be configured in arrangements that enable a player to
easily find the exit doors. He has certainly identified artificial
factors that probably do cause people to game more than they
planned to or wished to do. But then so do yellow boxes in grocery
stores that cause people to buy more cereal than they may have
wanted to buy. And the grocery stores also hide the milk, so that
once you find it you are surrounded by confusing pathways toward
the exit and also many other products that are begging you to
"buy, buy, buy." Stimuli are part of the entrepreneurial world and
are here to stay.80
In the G.A. cost study referenced above, respondents were
asked about other addictions - addictions to alcohol, drugs,
tobacco, shopping, and food.8' The cost profiles of those with other
addictions were compared to those without extra addictions.
Those who had alcohol, tobacco, and food addictions experienced
behaviors that led to higher cost profiles. Only with alcohol were
the higher costs significant. Many gaming critics, including
Quinn, have proposed that casinos totally ban drinking and
smoking." Others call for partial bans that require drinking (or
smoking) to take place in separate bar areas, and that drinks not
While these substances stimulate
be given freely to players.'
gaming, the requirement that a player absent himself/herself from
the game to imbibe or smoke would create a time barrier that
might cause the urge to game to subside.
Several critics suggest that casinos not be allowed to operate
on a twenty-four-hour basis. Among the symptoms of troubled
gaming is the gaming "binge," a long period of time during which a

79. Quinn, supra note 75, at 137.
80. VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS, CH. 7 (1957). Grocery
stores are seeking to trap a person until he or she buys things they may not
want. In doing so they are acting much like the casinos that hide their
restroom knowing that a person feeling physical anxiety will be likely to
gamble faster and with a bit less rationality. Doors are disguised or hidden
behind banks of slot machines. Exit ways are difficult to negotiate. Caesars
Palace in Las Vegas is famous for a moving sidewalk that covers several
hundreds of yards. However, the sidewalk only moves toward the casino; one
must leave under the own power of his or her legs. The fear that the casinos
ina competitive venue like Las Vegas have is that players will not just leave,
but that they will leave and go to another casino.
81. William N. Thompson & Keith R. Schwer, Nevada and the Win-Win
Game, Compulsive Gamblers and Alcohol, 3 CASINO LAWYER 16-18 (Summer
2007).
82. Quinn, supra note 75, at 137; Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-336 (1990).
83. See Press Release, The Methodist Church Media Service (Apr. 7, 2004),
available by e-mail request at mediaservice@methodistchurch.org.uk
(regarding opposition to a relaxing of drinking rules in English casinos).
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player is unable to stop.' If there were closing hours at a casino
the players would be "forced" to stop play, and during the "down
time" they could get over their urge to make bets. Quinn goes
another step: He advocates that casinos stop the gaming for five
minutes each hour. He also recommends that players have to
stand during all play, so that the urge to sit down could interfere
with the urge to continue play. These recommendations would
find little chance for adoption by the casinos, and the latter one
would certainly engender opposition from persons concerned with
the Americans with Disabilities Act.8
Several authorities have suggested that casinos not be
allowed to give loans (credit) to players or be allowed to cash
checks of any kind. It is quite unlikely that these ideas could ever
take hold in Las Vegas. On the "strip," about one-half of all table
play is made by players using casino credit. However, the ideas
couldOther
be taken seriously in smaller casino venues.86
issues of credit can also be addressed.
Credit card
machines and Automatic Teller Machines ("ATMs") flourish in
casinos. They should be removed from gaming floors, and also
they should be reprogrammed if they are near casino floors.
Casino credit card machines actually take a fee of 10 to 25% of
each loan, in addition to regular card interest. It can be surmised
that only a desperate person would use such a machine to gain
funds - a troubled gamer. ATMs provide a safe way for gamers to
access money. They need not carry large sums of cash to the
casino. However, the machines will typically allow a person to
take an advance (loan) on their bank account.87 The machines
could be programmed so that players can only take funds from
accounts that actually have the funds in them. Moreover, the
ATM machines should allow players to make deposits. In this way
the machines would add to general security, as winners (who are
very obvious by their demeanor and behavior) will not need to
leave the casino with large amounts of cash on their persons. Also,
by taking deposits, the machines might give the player a
convenient opportunity to end their play and leave, when
otherwise the urge to keep gaming beyond the time they had
planned to will remain.
Many machine players use plastic cards that identify
themselves and track their play. The cards could be programmed
to indicate limits on the amount of time or money a person wishes
84. Quinn, supra note 75, at 136; Thompson, supra note 31.
85. Quinn, supra note 75, at 137-38.

86. Interviews with unnamed casino personnel in Las Vegas.
87. Personal observation of ATMs and Credit Card machines in Las Vegas
casinos. It is also observed that casino ATMs tend to give out only large
denomination bills in contrast to ATMs in non-gaming locations. NGISC,
supra note 28, at 7-30; PAVALKO, supra note 26, at 140.
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to use at a machine. When the limit is reached, the person could
not continue play. Quinn recommends these limits and also
supports general loss limits that are now in effect only at Missouri
casinos (where a player must end play when he or she has lost
$500).8 While these ideas have merit vis-a-vis the troubled player
(in some or even most cases), they lack merit for serious nontroubled players. A limit removes a player from the opportunity to
remain in a game while he or she waits for a turn in luck and a
chance to regain funds already lost. 9
Bradley Fiorito focused attention on machine gaming. ° He
and others suggest that electronic gaming machines ("EGMs" or
"slots"), are designed to specifically deceive players and entice
them to gamble irrationally. They wish the player to remain
rational so that the player can exercise free will choice about
play." On one hand, this may be absurd because no rational
player would designate machine play as a rational activity in the
first place. Rational players know that the odds almost always
favor the casinos (there are certain times when a major jackpot
machine will use money already lost by players to form a jackpot
that can now be won with odds in favor of players).

88. Quinn, supra note 75, at 136; Missouri, supra note 15, at 92.
89. Casinos are almost always winners in games because they have large
bankrolls which permit them to overcome short term runs of luck which may
favor the players or the casinos. If they go "up" by $500, they can stay in the
game; if they go down by $500, they also can stay in the game. Players rarely
win in the long run, however, players can do well by adopting strategies
involving money management. They can impose self limits which are adjusted
to their own financial resources. Mandatory loss limits (as opposed to win and
loss limits) negate their abilities to do so. Also, players may adopt other
strategies. One is called the Martingale. It is a progressive loss strategy
involving doubling bets when one loses. It has many downsides, and in the
long run, a player will have to confront a losing streak that will destroy their
play. General limits on tables interfere with the possibilities of achieving the
ultimate win. However, pre-set limits on the overall amount a person can play
in a session almost negates use of the system totally.
90. Fiorito, supra note 74, at 1325.
91. Id. at 1346. There is a phenomenon in major gaming centers of "slot
gangs." These people move in and dominate a full bank of machines that are
tied to a progressive jackpot. The major prize may be won only, for instance,
one in 10,000 times. The prize may be set initially at $5,000. If one dollar
must be played in order to win, it is easy to see that the machine is against the
player. However, if each time a player loses one dollar at a play, some money
is put into the super prize - say ten cents, then the jackpot grows. After
50,000 losing plays, the big jackpot is now $10,000. The machine begins to
favor the player. The casino is not concerned because the bulk of the prize is
money that has already been lost by players. The gang controls play at all the
machines until the big prize is won. The odds are on their side. While from a
strict playing situation the casino may be happy to have the play of slot gangs,
the play interferes with a casino's notion of fair play and good customer
service. Casinos usually block off some of the machines for use by players they
know are not part of gangs.
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Moreover, much of the excitement of gaming is in a fantasy
akin to that of a child in Disneyland. Like children can indulge in
a fantasy, so can players indulge - and without dire consequences
following.
Be that as it may, suggestions are offered that
machines be slowed down in order to de-stimulate the gamer. The
phenomenon of showing the player an artificially created "near
miss" when the player loses is also considered unfair.' In fact, the
state of Nevada has ruled that "near misses" constructed in an
artificial manner may not be used in machines.93 Fiorito also is
disturbed that the reels on the machine give the player an
impression that machine odds are much better than they are. In
"reality" a "reel" may contain hundreds of "virtual" stop places,
rather than the 20 or so symbols shown. Hence it is more difficult
(or even impossible) for a player to calculate odds.' Nonetheless,
the odds on machines are generally known, and a player can sense
if they are higher (over 90% returned to player) or lower by the
money the player gets back. Competitive casinos even advertise
the general payback odds of their machines and where the
information is advertised it must be accurate.
Quinn goes a bit further and suggests that all machines in a
casino have the same payback odds.9" The "rational" player in a
casino is one who very willingly accepts that for fun and fantasy
he or she pays a price. The "real" rational players wish to buy fun.
A uniformity of payback odds represents a major step away from
fantasy play.
D. Take the Player Out of the Casino
1.

Voluntary Exclusion Programs

In its June 18, 1999 report, the National Gambling Impact
Study Commission reached a number of conclusions and made
numerous recommendations, including: (1) states are best
equipped to regulate gambling within their borders except for
tribal gaming and internet gaming; (2) legal gambling should be
restricted to persons who are at least twenty-one years of age; (3)
warnings about the dangers and risks of gambling and information
on how help can be obtained for a gambling problem should be
posted in prominent locations in all casinos; (4) state gambling
regulatory agencies should require licensed commercial casinos to
adopt a clear mission statement regarding the establishment's
policy on problem and pathological gambling and train
management and staff to recognize and address compulsive

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1341-44.
Id. at 1344; JEFF BURBANK, A LICENSE TO STEAL 104, 104-27 (2000).
Fiorito, supra note 74, at 1344-46.
Quinn, supra note 75, at 138.
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gambling behavior; (5) states should enact "hold harmless"
statutes permitting licensed commercial casinos to refuse service
to any customer whose gambling behavior "convincingly exhibits
indications of a gambling disorder" without fear of litigation by the
customer; and (6) gambling facilities should implement procedures
for self-exclusion that enable gamblers to ban themselves from the
gambling facility.
Exclusion from commercial casinos has, in turn, evolved into
two fundamentally different forms of exclusion - state mandated
exclusion and self-exclusion. As noted below in Table 3, all twelve
states that have legalized commercial casino style gambling have
adopted state mandated exclusion procedures, and nine out of the
twelve jurisdictions have adopted state regulatory procedures for
self-exclusion by problem gamblers.
The remaining three
jurisdictions, Nevada, Colorado, and South Dakota, permit the
individual commercial casino to adopt and implement selfexclusion procedures.
Table 3

Jurisdiction
Colorado
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Louisiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
South Dakota

State
Mandated

Self
Exclusion
nExclusion

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

_

_

_

_

_

Nine of the twelve states that permit commercial casinos
within their borders have express statutory or regulatory
procedures establishing the process by which a person can seek
self-exclusion from commercial casinos within the state." This is a
self-driven process.

96. Nevada, Colorado and South Dakota do not have state sponsored selfexclusion programs. However, the commercial casinos in each of these states
have the right to implement and enforce a casino specific self-exclusion
program.
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In 1996, Missouri became the first state to adopt specific selfexclusion procedures. The one common denominator that exists
with all of the self-exclusion statutes and regulations is that the
individual who seeks to be self-excluded must be the person
seeking and obtaining the self-exclusion.
Spouses, parents,
brothers, sisters, other family members, family friends, and
business associates do not have the power or authority to initiate
or impose self-exclusion on an individual. This is consistent with
case law that has declared that commercial casinos cannot be
required to ban a person from the casino at the request of a family
member.97
As shown in following Table 4, self-exclusion procedures vary
by state. Most of the states that have adopted and implemented
self-exclusion procedures have followed the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission's recommendation and adopted
processes that release the commercial casino from any liability
associated with the enforcement of a self-exclusion order, including
protection from liability in the event a self-excluded person
nonetheless enters a casino and gambles. The length of the selfexclusion varies from state to state and ranges from one year to a
lifetime exclusion. Some states permit subsequent removal from a
self-exclusion list, while others do not permit removal from the list
even where the self-exclusion is a lifetime exclusion. Inherent in
the self-exclusion process is the recognition that a person who has
a gambling problem must recognize that the problem exists and
must have internal motivation to address the problem.
As shown in following Table 5, violation of the self-exclusion
order by the self-excluded person exposes the individual to a
variety of penalties. The sanctions imposed range from placement
on the state's Excluded Person List (the involuntary list initiated
by state action), forfeiture of winnings, to being charged with
criminal trespass. In addition, the commercial casino is exposed to
state gambling agency sanctions.

97. See Brown v. Argosy, No. 02-CV-0209-SEB/WGH, 2003 WL 133266;
Merrill v. Trump Ind., Inc., No. 2:99-CV-292, 2002 WL 1307304 (N.D. Ind.
2002), affd 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).

2007]

Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling

1247

Table 4
SelfExclusion

State

Procedure
IL

IN

IA

LA

MI

L Appear in Person

MS

MO

0

II. File Application

0

0

III. Regulatory Auth.

NJ

PA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Verification of App.
IV. Written Ack'mt,

0

0

Affirmation or Afft
V. Waiver and Release

0

6

0

VI. Surrender Player

0

Club Cards
VII. Removal from Self-

0

0

Exclusion List
VIII. Length of Self-

5 Yr.

1 Yr.

5 Yr.

Exclusion

Min.

5 Yr.

Min.

Life

Life

1 Yr.

1 Yr.

Min;

5 Yr.

5 Yr.

Life

Life

Life

NJ

PA

5 Yr.

Life

Max.

Table 5
Sanctions
Against Self,
Excluded Person

State
IL

II. Forfeiture of Winnings

III. Forfeiture of Chips
and Credits
IV. Placement on
Involuntary Excluded
Persons List

IN

IA

LA

MI

MS

MO

0

I. Criminal Trespass

0

0
>$1,200

0

0

0

0
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2. Mandatory Exclusion Programs
a.

Nevada and the United States

In just about every casino jurisdiction some persons are
banned from the premises against their own desires. In Nevada,
the official bans are not related to troubled play, but rather to
criminal activity of the potential patron. The state's List of
Excluded Players places upon all of the casinos of the state the
obligation to bar entrance of listed persons from any part of their
properties - rooms, restaurants, shops, showrooms, as well as
gaming floors.' Casinos may be fined if they permit the person to
enter its property. The person is subject to arrest for trespassing.
The list is not extensive, having only thirty-five persons at present
time." Most are notorious figures from the past who are very old if
not already dead. New Jersey has a longer list with over three
hundred persons included. °°
There is also an informal exclusion list that is followed by most
larger casinos in Las Vegas. It is called "The Griffin Book." The
purpose of the list is to keep cheaters out of the casinos. Included on
the list are persons known to be "card-counters." These people
engage in legal behaviors allowing them to gain an odds advantage
over the casino in games of Blackjack. While their activity is not
illegal, Nevada casinos can choose to ban these people from their
premises. As with the state's List of Excluded Persons, those on the
list know they are on the list, and know they can be arrested for
trespass if they enter casinos that ban them. The casinos are not
fined if the excluded "Griffin Book" people enter.'
b.

Korea

Around the world, casinos keep lists of people who may not
enter their particular casino for a variety of reasons."2 Decisions
to place people in the excluded category are ad hoc and based upon
individual circumstances for each case. Certainly thieves and
cheaters are banned almost everywhere that they are known.
Troubled gainers are also subject to being excluded many places.
In most European jurisdictions, casinos respect requests of family
members to ban certain players. In some cases, the ban might be
98. Nevada Gaming Control Board, §§ 28.010-.090; see, e.g., R. FARRELL &
C. CASE, THE BLACK BOOK AND THE MOB (1995); M. Bowers and C. Titus,
Nevada's Black Book: The Constitutionality of Exclusion Lists in Casino
Gaming Regulation, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 313 (1997).

99. Nevada Gaming Control Board, List of Excluded Persons (2007).
100. New Jersey Casino Control Commission, List of Excluded Persons

(2007).
101. L. Benston, Griffin Book ProducerFiles for Chapter 11, LAS VEGAS SUN,
May 23, 2007, at 3.
102. See generally CABOT, supra note 3 (providing a list of locations).
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automatic; in most cases, the request for a ban is reviewed to
establish if it is valid before the person is notified he or she is not
welcome anymore. The length of such bans is also determined in
individual cases, as are conditions for removing the bans. 0 3
Two venues have formalized procedures for mandatory bans the casino at Kangwon Land Korea, and the nineteen casinos of
Switzerland. The Kangwon Land casino is the only Korean casino
(of fourteen) that lets Koreans gamble, albeit they must 0reside
4
outside of Kangwon Province (except for one day per month).
The philosophy behind Kangwon Land developed out of
national legislation passed in December of 1995 to bring economic
development to a depressed coal mining region. Officials of the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism thought a casino could be a
catalyst for development of tourist attractions such as ski resorts
and golf courses. But Kangwon Province was isolated, and it
would be difficult to draw in foreign gamblers, especially because
these players would first arrive in Seoul or Pusan, where casinos
catered to visitors. Hence, special permission was given to allow
Koreans to play. °5
The casino now welcomes 4,500 players per day. Each player
loses an average of $389 per visit, making the annual win of the
casino in excess of $600 million.'
Essentially all of the players
are Koreans. Therefore, the government takes a protective view
toward the players. 7
Players register identities, showing
addresses as they pass through metal detectors. There is a 5,000
won ($4.50 U.S.) entrance fee. While residents of the Province of
Kangwon are banned from daily play (they are allowed to play on
one Tuesday each month only-on that day 7,000 patrons enter
the doors), just about all of the players have made a treacherous
drive of four to five hours from Seoul or Pusan over mostly two
lane twisting mountain roads. They crowd into the casino, which
is open from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 a.m. the next morning, except on
Saturday evenings, when it remains open all night long (other
Korean casinos are open twenty-four hours per day).0 8
There is no credit play. However, the players need not carry
cash to the casino. They simply go to their bank for bank checks
that they can use to purchase chips. The casino has a full-service

103. WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HISTORY, ISSUES, AND SOCIETY 111-17 (2001).

104. W. Thompson, H.E. Yang, & I. Tanioka, Two Koreas: Walker Hill and
Kangwon Land, 9 GAMING L. REV. 144; W. Thompson, Gaming Erupts in Asia:
Korea Deficient in Casino Knowledge, 2 CASINO LAWYER 21, 21-23 (Summer
2006).

105. Thompson, Yang, & Tanioka, supra note 104, at 148.
106. Id. at 148-51.
107. Id. at 149.

108. Id. at 148-49.
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bank branch inside the facility.
In addition, no alcohol is
permitted in playing areas."
The casino also has a policy for dealing with problem
gamblers. Kangwon Land may be the only casino in the world
that has a gambling treatment center inside. Players are observed
to see if they have compulsive traits. Certain players are
approached by casino officials and given a green, yellow, or red
card. The green card is for a player who exhibits some warning
signs of troubled play. The player is told about problem gambling
and urged to be careful. The yellow card is given to players with
more serious evidence of problems, and they are urged to limit
their gambling and to seek counseling provided at the treatment
center. Red cards go to those with the most serious traits, and
they are urged to seek counseling and banned from play at the
casino for some period of time, which is flexible for the individual.
Players also may exclude themselves from play, and there are
procedures that allow family members to have someone banned
from play."'
c.

Switzerland
When voters approved modern Swiss casinos in a 1993 vote,
they did not exactly approve all gambling. In a way, they rejected
the widespread prevalence of slot machines by requiring that all
gambling (with the exception of the lottery) be inside the new
casinos."' Moreover, as a part of the licensing process, the casino
applicants had to show that they would have a specific program for
controlling problem gambling and play by troubled gamblers."'
After the nineteen casinos finally opened in 2002, they formed a
109. Id. at 149-50. It was observed that much of the play at the casino was
quite frantic. A casino manager was asked what the playing limits were meaning what was the minimum and maximum bet a player could make at a
single play. "On the main floor," it is $90 (10,000 won), and in the V.I.P. room,

it is $900." "But sir," the researcher asked, what precisely is the minimum
and what is the maximum." "That is irrelevant, my man. It is $90, and that is
what every player bets on every hand." Not only did the player at the seat
make that bet, but so too did many players standing behind the seated player
- on that one player's hand, or roulette spin. Players would place wooden

matchsticks into the space behind a slot button and the machine. In that way,
all the player had to do was feed the machine 10,000 won bills, and the
machines would just keep playing them at 50 won ($4.50) a clip. Players

would control two or three machines at a time. The casino win and player
visits (which are recorded in terms of numbers) indicated that the average
player visit resulted in a casino win of $375 - about four times the loss
experienced by a player in a fill day in Las Vegas. There is a reason that
Kangwon Land casino has a program of help for troubled gamblers.

110. Id. at 149.
111. W. Thompson, Switzerland's Casino Renaissance, 3 CASINO LAWYER 13,
13-15 (Winter 2007).

112. Id. at 14.
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national association that standardized
the programs now
13
identified as the Swiss "Social Concept."
The operation of the programs is monitored by the national
gambling commission. Casinos keep extensive records of Social
Concept activity. Each casino has a Social Concept Committee
that consists of administrators, supervisors and front-line
employees such as dealers.
The committee has a trained
psychologist or psychiatrist as an advisor. All employees are given
an extensive training course on the nature of problem gambling
and signs of troubled gambling that they must report to
management and ultimately the committee."'
Players must show identification at casino doors where they
are given information about troubled gambling. Each casino has a
brochure listing problem signs such as the twenty items on the
Gamblers Anonymous questionnaire."' Employees report signs of
troubled gambling to management. The signs are considered
either critical or serious. Three critical signs include (1) player
verbalization about "suicide;" (2) tantrums - yelling, cursing,
throwing objects; and (3) a player's "failure" to use a restroom
when necessary. Any exhibit of these behaviors results in an
immediate report to the committee, and upon verification (the
player is given notice and opportunity to respond), the player is
given a mandatory ban from all nineteen casinos for life.'16
Less critical but serious signs include things like changing
appearances (from clean-cut to disheveled for example), acting as
if one had not slept in a long time, acting nervous, looking about
suspiciously, and changing bets in unusual ways.
In these
situations, employees make a written report describing the action
observed and give it to management. This process can also be
initiated by a third party such as another player or a family
member. The report generates a period of several weeks of
observations of the player. If the behaviors persist, the matter is
referred to the committee where the player may be subject to a
mandatory ban for life. Alternatively, the player could be given
restrictions limiting play to a few times per month."7
The players may appeal a committee action. After one full
year, a player may request that a ban be lifted. The request must
indicate that the problem has ended, that the player has a job and
a source of income, that all debts have been paid, and that his or
her family situation is stable. The Swiss have very strict banking
secrecy laws, but they are set aside here. Bank accounts must be
113. W. Thompson, The Swiss Social Concept: Something for Las Vegas, 3
CASINO LAWYER 12, 12-14 (Spring 2007).
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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revealed or the player may not return. Players must demonstrate
that they underwent a treatment program.""
Players who are banned from the casinos are referred to
counselors for treatment. Several casinos even pay for initial
visits to the counselors.'19 Swiss gaming attorney R. Luka MullerStuder indicated in his May 2007 presentation to the International
Masters of Gaming Law conference in Chicago that definitive
research studies have yet to assess the specific effectiveness of the
Swiss Social Concept.
However, a general positive public
perception of casinos seems to flow from its use. Moreover, there
have been no player lawsuits regarding excessive or uncontrolled
play since the casinos opened. 2 '
E. Deficiencies in Voluntary and MandatoryBans
Official bans of players from casinos introduce a range of
issues. Although the regulation of the bans often indicate that no
liability to the player will fall on the Casino if they are deficient in
enforcing the bans, they do certainly place obligations for certain
actions on the casinos. If players on a ban list are permitted into a
casino, the gaming commissions may impose fines or other
disciplinary actions against the casinos. Because players try to
"sneak" in to play, and because most North American casinos have
open door policies and do not check identities at the entrance, it is
quite difficult to stop all banned players from entering. Indeed, a
study by Nowatzki and Williams that surveyed banned players
found that over one-third had entered the casinos during the
period of their ban."'
The institute of a ban policy would also give attorneys a
motivation to pursue law suits against casinos on behalf of banned
players who entered casinos and gambled to their detriment.
Although the cases to date have not resulted in judgments for
players, there have been "settlements," and attorneys continue to
seek out the perfect case that Rose and Owens referred to above.
In the case of Merrill v. Trump Indiana".. the plaintiff
gambler (Merrill) had entered a clinic in 1996 for treatment of his
pathological gambling. In the same year, his counselor informed
the Trump Indiana casino that he was not in control of his playing.
The counselor "won" an oral agreement that the casinos would
keep Merrill out of its facility, and in turn the clinic would
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. Id. at 13.
120. Presentation of I. Luka Mueller-Studer, Problem Gambling and
GamblingAddiction in Switzerland, Presentation to the International Masters
of Gaming Law Conference, Chicago, IL (May 25, 2007).
121. N. Nowatzki and R. Williams, Casino Self-Exclusion Programmes: A
Review of the Issues, 2 INT'L GAMBLING STUDIES 1, 3-24 (2002).
122. Merrill, 320 F.3d 729.
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promote the goodwill action of the casino. Merrill also wrote to the
casino and asked that he be banned from play. The casino put him
on its list of banned2 3persons - persons who would be ejected if they
entered the casino.
However, in 1998, Merrill's treatment ended, and he again
felt the urge to play. He returned to the casino. Instead of being
evicted, he was allowed to remain, and subsequently he incurred
very large losses. In a desperate financial condition, he resorted to
robbing several banks. He was arrested and sentenced to a federal
prison. He initiated a civil suit asking for $6 million dollars in
damages claiming that the casino was2 negligent
and had breached
4
an implied contract causing his losses.
In 2002, after Merrill was in prison, Indiana passed a casino
regulation requiring casinos to keep a list of banned players, and
allowing persons to voluntarily place themselves on the list. The
Trump casino had a list prior to that time. In the lawsuit, the
federal courts held that Indiana civil law did not recognize a
contract for Merrill's exclusion. Moreover, the judges indicated
that the casino did not have a legal obligation to look after
Merrill's good interest beyond providing him with personal safety.
The court ruled that even if his request to be banned had come
after Indiana required casinos to have the exclusion lists, Trump
Casino's violation of the procedures allowing Merrill to come into
the casino would not give Merrill a right to recovery of civil
damages. Rather, only the state gaming commission would be
permitted to seek disciplinary
action against the casinos with fines
12 5
or other penalties.
Disciplinary action was precisely what the Louisiana
Attorney General's Gaming Division sought against the Casino
Rouge of Baton Rouge when they allowed a person on the banned
list to continue to play. In June of 2005, the casino was fined
$50,000. The casino's slot machine department discovered the
player when he won a $1,250 jackpot that required his
identification before payment. The casino refused to pay the prize,
and the player was arrested. However, an investigation revealed
that the player had cashed many large checks, and also had
received twenty-two credit card advances after giving the casino
proper identification. At the time, the fine was the largest one
imposed on a casino anywhere
in the United States for allowing a
1 26
self-excluded person to play.
While recognizing the heretofore futility of American civil
court actions against casinos that do not abide by the letter of the
123.
124.
125.
126.

2005).

Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 732-33.
Press Release, Louisiana Attorney General, Charles C. Foti (June 20,
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self-exclusion policies in their venues, Andy Rhea, a Special
Assistant Attorney General in Mississippi suggested that such
may not be the case in the future. He wrote about two actions that
lead to results adverse to the interests of the casinos. In an
Austrian court, a player known to have severe financial problems
won a $600,000 judgment covering his losses during visits when he
should have been banned.127
In Ontario, Canada, a player placed herself on the selfexclusion list. Within weeks, she returned to the casino where she
had played before, and she engaged in a fifty-two hour gaming
binge. While driving home from the casino she wrecked her car.
She sued for moneys lost at the casino as well as for the value of
her car. The Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, owners of
the casino, did not want to risk their day in court. They settled
her claim.'28
Rhea accepts that self-exclusion policies create contracts that
can and should be enforceable by civil court actions. He finds
certitude that the player and casino fulfill two conditions in
contract making. There is a clear offer and an acceptance. The
third element of the contract process is a bit more elusive, yet he
feels that there is a consideration given that "seals the deal." He
points out that the player (potential player) is giving consideration
as he or she foregoes regular casino privileges, including the
opportunity to win large prizes, to be given complimentary
services, and the permission to cash checks. Rhea also recognizes
that casinos use their self-exclusion policies to advertise that they
have good intentions and are good corporate citizens, ergo, the
policies have value to the casinos. He expects future courts to find
that these agreements are contracts and that contract law can be
applied to the law suits that the gamers will win. Accordingly, he
urges that the casinos use all their means, including whatever
technology they have at their command, to assure that persons
who are self-excluded do not enter their facilities and engage in
gaming.
Besides liability, either through government discipline or in a
potential law suit, exclusion policies present practical problems to
casinos. Casinos must seek to give outstanding customer service
for the reasons set forth at the onset of this paper. However, with
a general ban policy resulting in hundreds or thousands of patrons
being placed on a list, every casino employee must be trained to
observe patrons to determine if they are on a list. When young
people are "carded" to make sure they are twenty-one at the casino
bar, the server will be obligated to assure that the patron is not
127. A. Rhea, Voluntary Self-Exclusion Lists: How They Work and Potential
Problems, 9 GAMING L. REV. 462, 463, 468-69 (2005).
128. Id. at 463.
129. Id. at 463, 468-69.
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banned. Persons checking into hotels may have to go through
further checks. Employees will be trained to observe excluded
persons "sneaking in" to the casino. In the process, the casino may
find that it is becoming more and more like an airport and less and
less like a friendly place of entertainment. The answer lies in an
alternate method.
F. An Alternative Method: Tell Them They Are NOT WELCOME
Las Vegas (and the surrounding metropolitan area of Clark
County) has 162 casinos (with gaming revenues over one billion
dollars per year), as well as perhaps one thousand or more other
"restricted" gaming locations - bars, grocery stores, and
restaurants - with fifteen or fewer slot machines.
Can bans of players work in Las Vegas, whether mandatory
or voluntary? One word answers the question: "NO." A policy of
mandatory exclusion could not be enforced, if it contemplated
exclusion from all these facilities. To be sure, individual casino
companies have "played" with the idea of having bans enforced on
their own properties. The Hilton-Caesars' operations (now part of
Harrah's) announced a plan that included exclusions even against
the will of the player two years ago. However, there have been no
reports on how the plan has been instituted, or whether bans have
been imposed since the merger of Harrah's and the Hilton-Caesars
group. Harrah's itself, the largest casino conglomerate in the
world, has been a pioneer in recognizing the need for a responsible
gambling program. Harrah's was the first casino organization to
post warning signs and to distribute literature about problem
gambling and where to get help (now a requirement for all Nevada
casinos), and Harrah's has instituted voluntary bans. Several
casino venues (not Nevada) in the United States require that
casinos have a voluntary ban system.
The Swiss notion of
compulsory bans jurisdiction-wide has thus far been beyond the
mindset of American casino operators and their regulators.
The plain truth is that a policy for mandatory bans for
troubled gamblers could not be enforced beyond the doors of
individual casinos.
Even at specific casinos, bans would be
difficult to enforce. The experience of voluntary bans shows the
difficulty of effective implementation. It is too easy for banned
players to enter the casinos.
American casinos thrive only with open door policies that
permit flows of thousands, indeed tens of thousands, of patrons
every day. Identity checks at doors would require major
interferences with needed flows of customers. Moreover, the
multiple casinos and other gambling spots in Las Vegas would
preclude opportunities to seriously cut off gambling opportunities
from any troubled gambler who seriously attempted to find a
friendly table or slot machine.
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So can anything be done along the lines of what is being done
in Switzerland or Kangwon Land, Korea or even in the voluntary
ban venues? Here the answer is also clear: "YES." The following
suggestions are drawn from co-author William Thompson's study
first presented in Casino Lawyer Magazine. 3 ° They are given as
points of discussion for policy makers who should be concerned
that casinos keep the face of integrity on their operations, and in
turn avoid situations that may lead to future litigation.
Thompson suggested that Las Vegas might possibly institute
a "list of unwelcome patrons." This should be an official list kept
by public authorities. Patrons for the list would be nominated by
the casinos, but could also be nominated by other interested
parties, including appropriate family members, bankruptcy courts
and other judicial authorities. The casinos would be required to
have officials and committees such as those in Swiss casinos. They
would monitor players and observe behaviors such as the ones on
the list of factors examined in the Swiss casinos. Warning signs
such as used at Kangwon Land (green, yellow, and red cards)
could be employed. At critical times, observations would lead to
recommendations that persons be put on the list. The Swiss
critical factors (tantrums, talk of suicide, "forgetting to go to the
bathroom") would certainly earn a player a place on the list.
The decision to put a person on the list would be made by a
government committee. However, before the decision was to be
made, the patrons involved would have a clear opportunity to
make a presentation indicating why he or she should not be put on
the list. Due process considerations would be involved, and the
decision to place a person on the list would occur only after good
evidence suggested that the person's behavior at gambling
activities could result in considerable harm to the person or to
others dependent upon him or her. A person would remain on the
list for a set minimum time, perhaps one year. After that time,
the gamer could be removed from the list upon application. The
committee would consider factors such as those considered in
Switzerland when decisions to remove the person would be made.
The list would be computerized and delivered to every
gambling venue in the state. The person would be photographed,
and their finger prints would be taken, albeit they would give
fingerprints voluntarily.
Those persons placed upon the list would not be banned from
any casino. However, they would not be "welcome" at the casino.
Accordingly, all casinos would agree to remove the person from
any promotion list. They would be removed from all players' clubs.
No advertisements would be sent to them at any address. They
would receive no promotions or deals - specials related to

130. Thompson, supra note 113.
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gambling. They would be permitted to participate in deals for
shows and dinners as long as the activities were unrelated to
gambling (in states where casinos are not essential as part of the
community social fabric, meal and show promotions could also be
restricted from such persons). These players would have no credit
at the casinos. Use of credit card machines would be restricted.
They could not cash checks at the casino. These persons would be
notified that they could not win prizes that would require
identification - that is, slot machine jackpots of over $1,200. They
would not be allowed to make cash transactions of over $10,000
because these would require identifications for the I.R.S. Any
such prizes would be held by the casino and given to a state fund
to support the program and other programs for treatment of
problem gamblers.
The players on the list would be given a certified letter
explaining policies. They could be asked to leave casino premises
at any time by casino authorities without any legal recourse.
VI. CONCLUSION

American casino gaming operates under rules quite different
than rules in Europe. Nonetheless, American casinos should show
the same concern for troubled gamblers that is shown by the Swiss
Social Concept. The above ideas regarding a "list of unwelcome
patrons" are offered as ideas for discussion and consideration.

